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 EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
DECISION TO SEEK CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR A 
MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF UNILATERAL ACTION 
 
Kenneth R. Mayer* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary axiom of the unilateral-powers literature is that the institutional 
setting and political incentives that confront presidents push them to seek 
maximum discretion over policy. The straightforward implication is that presidents 
will seek control (Terry Moe calls it autonomy1)—always contentious given the 
competitive political authority at the heart of separation of powers, but necessary 
to them given their interests and position in the political system.2 Empirically, 
presidents are expected to (and do) act unilaterally, moving first to put their stamp 
on policy and process, shape institutional structures, and alter the status quo to 
shift government outputs toward their preferred position. A corollary is that 
presidents will not voluntarily surrender the discretion that their institutional 
position provides and their political interest demands, because doing so leaves their 
fate in the hands of other actors with very different goals and interests. Unilateral 
action can increase governability, as the President retains the capacity to function 
even in the face of gridlock or partisan opposition.3 
* © 2014 Kenneth R. Mayer. Professor, Department of Political Science and Affiliate 
Faculty at La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Madison-Wisconsin. I am 
indebted to James Sieja, who provided valuable research assistance. 
1 Terry M. Moe, Presidents, Institutions, and Theory, in RESEARCHING THE 
PRESIDENCY: VITAL QUESTIONS, NEW APPROACHES 337, 364–65 (George C. Edwards III 
et al. eds., 1993). 
2 See id.; Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11–12 (Spring 1994). See also generally WILLIAM G. 
HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 
(2003) (arguing that presidents regularly set public policies over vocal objections by 
Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy); KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE 
OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2001) (analyzing the pattern of 
presidents’ use of executive orders and describing an office much more powerful and 
active than the one depicted in the bulk of the political-science literature). This notion finds 
analogues in other presidency literatures, such as Stephen Skowronek’s argument that the 
presidency is a uniquely “order-shattering institution in that it prompts each incumbent to 
take charge of the independent powers of his office and to exercise them in his own right.” 
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS 
TO BILL CLINTON 20 (6th prtg. 2003) (emphasis in original).  
3 Norman Ornstein makes this argument in the context of recess appointments. See 
Norman J. Ornstein, Disarming the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2014, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/01/22/opinion/disarming-the-white-house.html?_r=0. 
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President Barack Obama reflected this pattern, to the consternation of many 
of his supporters. Although he explicitly and repeatedly promised to reverse many 
Bush administration policies and practices and rejected his predecessor’s view of 
executive power, he actually made few dramatic retrenchments and even went 
further in some areas. The prison at Guantanamo Bay remains open, and the 
President has all but given up on his promise to close it. He restarted the military 
commission process to adjudicate cases against detainees charged with terror 
offenses,4 and he continued the policy of extraordinary rendition.5 His 
administration invoked the state-secrets doctrine to head off litigation, and it 
claimed executive privilege to keep information from Congress.6 His Justice 
Department has aggressively investigated leaks of classified information and 
initiated more prosecutions under the Espionage Act (eight) than all previous 
administrations combined (three).7 On two occasions, the Office of Legal Counsel 
advised the President that statutory restrictions in appropriations acts were 
unconstitutional and could be ignored.8 The frequency of drone attacks has 
increased dramatically, and President Obama claims the authority to order the 
killing of American citizens who engage in terror activities abroad, without any 
due process protections or independent checks.9 He ordered military action in 
4 Jordan J. Paust, Still Unlawful: The Obama Military Commissions, Supreme Court 
Holdings, and Deviant Dicta in the D.C. Circuit, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 367, 367–68 
(2013). 
5 LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 251 (3d ed. 2013); Michael J. Glennon, 
National Security and Double Government, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 2 (2014). 
6 Louis Fisher, The Law: Obama’s Executive Privilege and Holder’s Contempt: 
“Operation Fast and Furious”, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 167, 179–80 (2013). 
7 Glennon, supra note 5, at 7; David McCraw & Stephen Gikow, The End to an 
Unspoken Bargain? National Security Leaks in a Post-Pentagon Papers World, 48 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 473, 492 (2013). 
8 Both issues involved language that prohibited the executive branch from funding 
certain diplomatic activities. These were a 2009 ban on paying expenses for a U.S. 
delegation to any United Nations body chaired by a country that the Secretary of State had 
designated as a sponsor of international terrorism and a 2011 ban prohibiting the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy from entering into any bilateral agreement 
with China or Chinese companies. See generally Memorandum from Virginia A. Seitz, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, on the Unconstitutional Restrictions on 
Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(A) of the 
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Sept. 19, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/conduct-diplomacy.pdf; Memo-
randum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, on the 
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act (June 
1, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/section7054.pdf. The Office 
of Legal Counsel concluded that these activities fell within the President’s exclusive 
authority to conduct diplomatic relations, rendering the statutory language unconstitutional. 
Id. 
9 Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made 
-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all. NBC News obtained a “White Paper,” 
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Libya without any congressional approval, maintaining that the operation did not 
constitute a “war” that required a congressional declaration or fell within the 
meaning of the War Powers Act.10 The President has “continued, and in some 
ways, expanded, Bush era surveillance policies”11 and has embraced weak reforms 
only after the leaks by Edward Snowden revealed a monumental electronic 
surveillance apparatus that included monitoring of allied leaders and collecting 
data on Americans’ phone calls.12 Compared to President George W. Bush, “in 
several fundamental respects we have experienced wider assertions of 
unconstitutional executive authority under President Obama.”13 
Domestically, President Obama revised immigration policy when it became 
clear that Congress would not act, suspending prosecutions for many illegal 
immigrants in what became known as the “mini-DREAM Act”;14 declined to 
which it claimed was based on a classified memo that outlined the basic argument for the 
U.S. government’s ability to kill American citizens it believes to be an “associated force.” 
See Michael Isikoff, Justice Department Memo Reveals Legal Case for Drone Strikes on 
Americans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 3013, 5:57 PM), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/ 
2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-a 
mericans. According to The New York Times, the leaked paper “closely tracks the rationale 
in [the classified] document.” Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Memo Cites Legal Basis for 
Killing U.S. Citizens in Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013 
/02/05/us/politics/us-memo-details-views-on-killing-citizens-in-al-qaeda.html.  
10 See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, on the Authority to Use Military Force in Libya 7 (Apr. 1, 2011), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/libya.pdf. Louis Fisher, a long-standing 
opponent of presidential uses of force absent congressional authorization, found the 
administration’s justifications “not only strained, but several cases incredulous.” Louis 
Fisher, The Law: Military Operations in Libya: No War? No Hostilities?, 42 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 176, 177 (2012). In ignoring the War Powers Resolution, Bruce Ackerman and 
Oona Hathaway write, President Obama had pushed beyond what President Clinton and 
President Bush had done: “Make no mistake: Obama is breaking new ground, moving 
decisively beyond his predecessors.” Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Death of the 
War Powers Act?, WASH. POST, May 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
death-of-the-war-powers-act/2011/05/17/AF3Jh35G_story.html. 
11 Glennon, supra note 5, at 6. 
12 See Barton Gellman, Obama’s Restrictions on NSA Surveillance Rely on Narrow 
Definition of ‘Spying’, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world 
/national-security/obamas-restrictions-on-nsa-surveillance-rely-on-narrow-definition-of-sp 
ying/2014/01/17/2478cc02-7fcb-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html; Alison Smale et. al, 
Data Suggests Push to Spy on Merkel Dates to ’02, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2013, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/10/28/world/europe/data-suggests-push-to-spy-on-merkel-dates-to-02.ht 
ml. 
13 Michael D. Ramsey, Meet the New Boss: Continuity in Presidential War Powers?, 
35 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 863 (2012). 
14 Robert Delahunty and John Yoo argue that President Obama wrote into law what 
Congress had declined to enact via an unconstitutional abdication of the President’s “take 
care” obligations. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama 
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defend the Defense of Marriage Act against legal challenges;15 used recess 
appointments when the Senate would not confirm his nominations;16 centralized 
policy making within the White House, relying on policy “czars” for advice and 
coordination and hinting that he would ignore appropriations language that limited 
his ability to pay them;17 relied on signing statements just as earlier presidents 
had;18 and used the regulatory process to limit greenhouse gas emissions to address 
climate change in response to Congress’s failure to enact clean-energy 
legislation.19  
In short, President Obama has taken a broad view of executive authority, 
acting to preserve and extend his autonomy in both domestic and foreign policy 
and at times pushing beyond what President Bush was willing to do. In acting 
unilaterally, he articulated the same justifications as his predecessors did: 
compensating for congressional opposition and dysfunction, protecting national 
security and the national interest, interpreting statutory and constitutional language 
in a way that preserves presidential flexibility, and protecting the institution of the 
presidency. He behaved, in other words, just as theory predicted, even when his 
actions differed sharply from what he said as a candidate about what he would do 
as President. His presidency validates the empirical implications of the unilateral-
action model. 
Placed against this pattern, President Obama’s decision to ask for 
congressional approval of a military attack against Syria in August 2013, after the 
regime used chemical weapons against civilians, stands out as a clear outlier. Here, 
President Obama departed from what unilateral-action theories predicted, from his 
pattern of showing no reluctance to do it alone in other contexts, and from the 
longer historical pattern of presidents actively working to expand the reach of their 
authority and their range of discretionary action. It is thus an anomaly that invites 
analysis and explanation, and it presents an opportunity to assess the state of 
unilateral-action theory.  
There are several elements to consider. The first is whether the President’s 
action (or, more properly, inaction) poses a challenge to the theory itself. If a 
President departs from the underlying expectations in such a prominent way, is it 
merely an aberration, or is it an indication that the theory is wrong? The theoretical 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take 
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 835–51 (2013). 
15 Kathleen Tipler, Obama Administration’s Non Defense of DOMA and Executive 
Duty to Represent, 73 MD. L. REV. 287, 291–99 (2013). 
16 Peter E. Quint, Implications of the President’s Appointment Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 
85, 90–99 (2013). 
17 Mitchell A. Sollenberger & Mark J. Rozell, The Law: Prerogative Power and 
Executive Branch Czars: President Obama’s Signing Statement, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 819, 819–20, 831–32 (2011). 
18 See Christopher S. Kelley, Rhetoric and Reality? Unilateralism and the Obama 
Administration, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 1146, 1149–57 (2012). 
19 Jody Freeman, Climate and Energy Policy in the Obama Administration, 30 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 376, 378–85 (2012). 
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predictions are surely not that a President will never forego unilateral action when 
faced with a decision point (indeed, there are many examples of presidents doing 
just that). But such a conspicuous deviation, where the President’s ability to act 
was unchallengeable, needs exploration, and fitting it into the existing framework 
requires more than the facile reasoning that the President must have felt that the 
costs of action were greater than the costs of inaction, or vice versa.  
Alternative explanations might be that it was a “mistake” that resulted from a 
flawed assessment of what the situation required or that it was the result of 
previous poor decisions that put the President in an impossible situation. Here, the 
insight of political scientist Richard Neustadt’s view of the presidency is 
instructive. In Presidential Power, Neustadt argued that presidents lack the 
authority needed to carry out the job. As a consequence, presidential power comes 
not from the ability to command but instead is “the power to persuade.”20 
Scholarly attention to unilateral powers challenged this view, providing a 
theoretical model and empirical evidence showing that presidents can frequently 
get their way via unilateral action.21  
Neustadt’s view and the unilateral approach are usually seen as antagonists, 
but when applied to this event, both converge on the same conclusion. Neustadt 
emphasized the importance of “power stakes” to presidents, which he defined as 
the understanding of the effects that a current decision can have on future events 
and ability to act. An effective President “guards his power prospects in the course 
of making choices”22 and understands that “adequate or not, a President’s own 
choices are the only means in his own hands of guarding his own prospects for 
effective influence.”23 Neustadt was writing about persuasion and influence, not 
about formal authority and institutional process, but the argument is almost 
identical to unilateral theory’s emphasis on the President’s need to preserve 
discretion and flexibility. 
Finally, I ask what this means for the argument that presidential authority 
expands but does not contract, with each successive increase becoming a new point 
of departure for future expansions (i.e., the “ratchet effect”).24 President Obama 
provides some support for both sides in this debate. On the one hand, he has been 
at least as aggressive as President Bush in moving unilaterally in most areas and 
thus validates the ratchet metaphor. But on the other hand, in explicitly declining 
to act unilaterally, President Obama also confirms that expanding presidential 
20 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE 
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 11 (1990). 
21 See HOWELL, supra note 2, at xiv–xvi; MAYER, supra note 2, at 16–22; Kenneth R. 
Mayer, Going Alone: The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 427, 427–50 (George C. Edwards III & 
William G. Howell eds., 2009); Moe supra note 1, at 364–65; Moe & Wilson supra note 2, 
at 3. 
22 NEUSTADT, supra note 20, at 47. 
23 Id. at 49. 
24 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 131–32 (2007); Mayer, supra note 21, at 443. 
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authority is not the only possibility. Explicitly backing away from unilateral action 
might appear to roll back presidential power by setting a new precedent in the 
opposite direction, which might mean that future presidents may have to justify 
their own expansive readings and explain why they are ignoring this earlier 
precedent. 
Placing President Obama’s use-of-force decision within the unilateral-action 
framework leads to two conclusions. The first is that President Obama’s decision 
to go to Congress regarding Syria was a mistake, not because it was 
constitutionally unnecessary, but because it will constrain his discretion and make 
it much more difficult to act credibly in future contingencies. The second is that it 
is not likely to have any consequences for the contemporary practice of 
presidential use of force. Instead, it will serve as a cautionary tale for future 
presidents, who will dismiss President Obama’s decision as an aberration not 
applicable to what they are facing.  
 
I.  OBAMA AND SYRIA 
 
Since the beginning of unrest and civil war in Syria in 2011—which has killed 
over one hundred thousand people and displaced millions of desperate 
refugees25—President Obama rejected direct U.S. military involvement in the 
conflict. But at an August 2012 press conference, the President said that the 
preparation or use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government was a “red line” 
that would “change [the] calculus” for military action.26 He would come to regret 
those words. President Obama had authorized limited military aid to rebel forces in 
June 2013 in the aftermath of reports that Syrian forces had used chemical 
weapons in some small-scale attacks; it is unclear whether any arms had actually 
been shipped, in part because of worries that lethal aid could fall into the hands of 
Jihadi groups affiliated with the resistance.27  
On August 21, 2013, the Syrian military used chemical weapons in an attack 
that killed nearly fifteen hundred civilians, including nearly four hundred 
children.28 Shortly thereafter, the White House signaled that President Obama was 
ready to order a military strike to punish Syrian President Bashir al-Assad and 
25 See Alan Cowell, War Deaths in Syria Said to Top 100,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/world/middleeast/syria.html. 
26 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the White House Press 
Corps (Aug. 20, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/2 
0/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps. 
27 JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
33487, ARMED CONFLICTS IN SYRIA: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 8–10 (2013). 
28 Karen DeYoung & Anne Gearan, U.S. Officials’ Strong Words on Syria Signal 
That Attack Is Near, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/n 
ational-security/kerry-lays-out-evidence-of-chemical-weapons-attack-by-syria/2013/08/30/ 
d1c19d58-118f-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html. 
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degrade his capability to launch further chemical attacks.29 Administration 
officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, justified the impending military 
action as moral, important to U.S. strategic interests, and, in the secretary’s words, 
“directly related to our credibility and whether countries still believe the United 
States when it says something.”30 
But several days later, President Obama announced that he would seek 
congressional approval for an attack, even though he had “decided that the United 
States should take military action against Syrian regime targets” and believed that 
he had “the authority to carry out this military action without specific 
congressional authorization.”31 This step was unprecedented (at least in the modern 
era) as there are no other instances of a President asking for advance congressional 
approval for an attack of this scale. While presidents have sought congressional 
authorization prior to ordering limited military operations, most of the cases were 
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and involved sending personnel into 
combat or prolonged defensive operations.32 More recent examples involved 
peacekeeping operations (Lebanon in 1983) or broader Area Resolutions 
authorizing the President to use the military in Asia (1955) and the Middle East 
(1957) if he deemed it necessary. President Bill Clinton asked for congressional 
support for an air campaign in Kosovo in 1999, but he was clear that he would not 
base his ultimate decision on congressional approval.  
There is no doubt that under long-standing practice and formal legal opinions, 
President Obama had the authority to order a military attack relying solely on his 
commander-in-chief power. Even if an attack on Syrian chemical weapons 
capabilities presented a unique set of circumstances—no direct threat to 
Americans, no United Nations approval, and no support from any allies—that 
29 See Mark Landler et al., Obama Set for Limited Strike on Syria as British Vote No, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 08/30/us/politics/obama-syria. 
html; Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-pow 
er-in-syrian-conflict.html?pagewanted=all; Thom Shanker et al., Obama Weighs “Limited” 
Strikes Against Syrian Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
08/28/world/middleeast/obama-syria-strike.html.  
30 DeYoung & Gearan, supra note 28.  
31 President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Syria (Aug. 31, 2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/ 
statement-president-s yria. 
32 Jennifer Elsea and Richard Grimmett identify five cases prior to 1900: two in 1798 
when Congress authorized the use of the Navy to protect American vessels engaged in civil 
shipping from seizure by France; one in 1802 authorizing the Navy to attack and seize 
Tripolitan ships; one in 1815 authorizing action to protect American shipping from 
Algerian attacks; and one in 1819 for protecting American shipping from piracy. JENNIFER 
K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31133, DECLARATIONS 
OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 88–94 (2011). 
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would not change the prevailing legal understandings of what the President could 
do.33  
The President’s decision to go to Congress thus represented an anomaly in the 
patterns of unilateral power that was inconsistent with both President Obama’s 
overall reliance on executive authority and his previous uses of military force. 
President Obama had shown less concern with strict constitutional process in 
ordering attacks in Libya without advance congressional approval. In that instance, 
the Office of Legal Counsel advised him that “[t]he President had the 
constitutional authority to direct the use of military force in Libya because he 
could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the national interest. . . . 
[P]rior congressional approval was not constitutionally required to use military 
force in the limited operations under consideration.”34 The administration also 
argued the operations did not constitute “hostilities” contemplated in the War 
Powers Act because they “do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of 
fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, 
U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation 
into a conflict characterized by those factors.”35  
Unilateral theory observes that presidents surrender discretion at their own 
peril, and what followed President Obama’s announcement reinforced that danger. 
Legislators immediately moved to put conditions on any use of force as they added 
their own caveats and constraints. Even if the President fully expected to obtain 
approval (a confidence that turned out to be wildly overestimated, as noted below), 
he could not have expected legislators to pass whatever he asked.  
Despite reports that the contemplated attack would involve missiles fired from 
ships and aircraft well outside of Syrian borders, the President proposed an open-
ended authorization to use military force to “prevent or deter the use or 
proliferation” of chemical weapons or to “protect the U.S. and its allies and 
partners against the threat posed by such weapons.”36 That language would not 
survive. After the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed its deliberations, 
33 See Ian Hurd, Bomb Syria, Even if It Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-is-illegal.html?_r=0 
(arguing that an attack would be illegal under international law—presumably whether 
Congress authorized it or not—but that the President should order it anyway). 
34 Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, on the Authority to Use Military Force in Libya 1 (Apr. 1, 2011), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/libya.pdf. 
35 Report from Joseph E. Macmanus, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of State and 
Elizabeth L. King, Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Defense, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, on the U.S. Activities in Libya (June 15, 2011). 
36 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Draft Resolution of Use 
of U.S. Military in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, August 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactiv 
e/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria-resolution.html.  
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the legislation it reported to the floor on a narrow 10–7 vote37 imposed a “limited 
and specified” condition on the use of force, required a written presidential 
determination delivered in advance to Congress including a certification that the 
United States “has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means” to 
address the threat of chemical weapons in Syria, required ongoing reports, 
prohibited the use of American combat personnel inside the country, and set time 
limits.38 A House version authorized only a single round of missile strikes, with 
time limits and a ban on troop deployments.39 The administration opposed the ban 
on deployments—“boots on the ground”—because it would “take off the table an 
option that might or might not be available to a president of the United States to 
secure our country” in the event the President decided it was necessary.40 
The decision to go to Congress is even more perplexing given that all of the 
available evidence suggests that Obama would have lost, and lost badly, any 
congressional vote on military action. While the unofficial vote counts do not 
consider what might have happened once the White House began applying intense 
pressure, the numbers were overwhelmingly negative from the start. In early 
September, The Washington Post counted 263 House members as against or 
leaning against, and only 25 expressing public support.41 The count in the Senate 
was 23 in favor and 43 against or leaning against, with 34 undecided.42 A CNN 
tally was 25 yes votes and 179 no in the House with the remaining undecided or 
unknown.43 A CBS count was 32 in support to 199 opposed in the House and 27 
for to 33 opposed in the Senate.44 These counts occurred after the House leadership 
had publicly expressed support for the authorization and after the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee had reported its limited resolution to the floor. The President 
was losing by at least 6 to 1 (and by up to 10 to 1) in the House and nearly 2 to 1 in 
37 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to 
Respond to the Use of Chemical Weapons, S.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S.%20J.%20 Res.%20211.pdf. 
38 Id. 
39 Karen Tumulty, Reps. Chris Van Hollen, Gerry Connolly Draft Narrow 
Authorization of Force in Syria, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.co 
m/politics/van-hollen-connolly-draft-narrow-authorization-of-force-in-syria/2013/09/03/7c 
bc6b60-14c0-11e3-b182-1b3bb2eb474c_story.html. 
40 Hearing on U.S. Military Action Against the Syrian Government Before the S. 
Comm. Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of John Kerry, Sec’y of State), 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S.%20J.%20Res.%20211.pdf. 
41 Aaron Blake, Where the Votes Stand on Syria, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2013, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/09/02/where-the-votes-stand-on-syria/. 
42 Id. 
43 U.S. House: How They’ll Vote on Syria Strike, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 10, 2013, 4:00 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2013/09/politics/syria-congress-vote-count/house.ht 
ml.  
44 Stephanie Condon, Little Support for Syria Strike in Congress, CBS News Estimate 
Shows, CBSNEWS.COM (Sept. 10, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/little-su 
pport-for-syria-strike-in-congress-cbs-news-estimate-shows/. 
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the Senate. This was shaping up to be an embarrassing public repudiation on a 
crucial national-security issue. 
An unexpected set of events saved the President from defeat. At a joint press 
conference in London on September 9, 2013, with British Foreign Secretary 
William Hague, Secretary of State Kerry was asked if there was “anything at this 
point that [President Assad’s] government could do or offer that would stop an 
attack.”45 Kerry answered almost off the cuff: “Sure. He could turn over every 
single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next 
week. Turn it over, all of it, without delay, and allow a full and total accounting for 
that. But he isn’t about to do that, and it can’t be done, obviously.”46 Almost 
immediately, both President Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to 
do just that. The next day, in a nationally televised address that was originally 
intended to explain military action, President Obama announced that he would 
instead pursue a diplomatic solution.47 Syria agreed to join the international treaty 
banning chemical weapons, and the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
approved a resolution requiring Syria to surrender its chemical weapons.48 Had he 
not enjoyed this reprieve, President Obama would have been in the difficult 
position of appearing indecisive and lacking the support of his own party on a war-
powers question.  
Why would a President choose to handcuff himself, severely limit his 
flexibility in a core area of unilateral action, and invite what would have been a 
humiliating defeat? Taking the President at his word—that he believed he had the 
authority to order an attack but would be in a stronger political and strategic 
position with a congressional authorization—does not tell us why or how he could 
have miscalculated so badly in assessing the chances of actually obtaining that 
authorization or why he would choose to “transfer[] greater responsibility for U.S. 
foreign policy to a Congress that is more divided, more incapable of reasoned 
debate or action, and more dysfunctional than any in modern American history.”49 
As a pragmatic matter, the President may have wanted Congress to share the 
blame if the attack went badly or triggered wider U.S. involvement or a broader 
conflict, particularly given deepening public skepticism of interventionist foreign 
45 John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary 
Hague (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/21395 
6.htm. 
46 Id. 
47 Michael D. Shear, Planned as Call to Act, Obama’s Speech Became Plea to Wait, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/world/obama-syria.html? 
pagewanted=1&_r=0. 
48 Colum Lynch & Anne Gearan, U.N. Security Council Unanimously Passes Syria 
Chemical Weapons Resolution, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/national-security/un-approval-near-on-syrian-chemical-arms/2013/09/27/da007 
544-27aa-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html. 
49 David Rothkopf, The Gamble: Five Big Consequences of the President’s Call to 
Let Congress Decide About America’s Syrian Intervention, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 31, 
2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/31/the_ gamble. 
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policy. He may have been looking for a way not to attack and gone to Congress 
because he anticipated that they would say no. Some observers attribute President 
Obama’s backtracking on Syria to a failure to obtain international cooperation for a 
military attack, or to British Prime Minister David Cameron’s inability to obtain 
parliamentary approval for British involvement in the military response.50 The 
decision may have resulted from deep divisions and uncertainty among President 
Obama’s advisors about the consequences of an attack or from concern that 
unilateral action would complicate future congressional support for foreign policy 
issues, specifically on Iran.51 Perhaps President Obama felt the need to distinguish 
himself from President Bush and deflect criticism that he was unilaterally taking 
the country into another war. His earlier “red line” remark may have boxed him 
into a position in which his credibility was at stake.52 It is even possible—however 
unlikely it appears to be—that President Obama envisioned a diplomatic solution 
all along, threatening military action only to bring Syria and Russia to the 
bargaining table and going to Congress to buy time for his plan to work.53 
Even if President Obama was constitutionally correct in seeking congressional 
authorization, wanted to avoid a military attack altogether, or saw the potential of 
diplomacy from the beginning, he acted in a way that hurt his presidency.54 The 
decisions appeared to be ad hoc, starting with the President’s 2012 “red line” 
comment that surprised many of his advisors, “underscore[d] the improvisational 
nature of Mr. Obama’s approach to one of the most vexing crises in the world,”55 
50 David E. Sanger, After British Vote, Unusual Isolation for U.S. on Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/world/after-british-vote-unusu 
al-isolation-for-us-on-syria.html. 
51 Mark Mazzetti et al., Obama’s Uncertain Path Amid Syria Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/world/middleeast/ obamas-uncertain-
path-amid-syria-bloodshed.html?pagewanted=all. 
52 Julian Pecquet & Ian Swanson, Obama Boxed In on Syria, THE HILL (Aug. 25, 
2013, 10:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/318595-o 
bama-in-a-corner-on-syria. 
53 Mark Fitzpatrick, Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons, 55 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL 
POL. & STRATEGY 107, 108 (2013) (claiming that Kerry’s remark “did not come totally out 
of the thin air. Russia and the United States reportedly discussed the [disarmament] idea in 
advance.”) 
54 Fisher insists that President Obama was correct in seeking congressional 
authorization, while David Cole has little patience with the argument that going to 
Congress was a mistake. Instead of an unconstitutional decision to use military force absent 
congressional authorization, President Obama “is now pursuing a path that accords with the 
rule of law, and may in fact be more effective at deterring further use of chemical weapons. 
Indeed, it may even prepare the way for a diplomatic strategy to end the underlying civil 
war.” David Cole, Clogging the War Machine, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS BLOG (Sept. 19, 2013, 
9:10 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/sep/19/syria-clogging-war-machi 
ne/. 
55 Peter Baker et al., Off-the-Cuff Obama Line Put U.S. in Bind on Syria, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/middleeast/ obamas-vow-on-che 
mical-weapons-puts-him-in-tough spot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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and forced the President’s hand after the August chemical attack. The off-hand 
remark was a “terrible—and all too representative . . . blunder.”56 Inside the 
government, White House staffers were commenting (sometimes on the record) 
about foot-dragging, “navel gazing,” and abrupt policy reversals on Syria.57 
President Obama’s abrupt decision to go to Congress “baffled even his closest 
advisors”58 and “overruled the advice of many of his aides who worried about [a 
congressional] defeat.”59  
Ultimately, the President asked for the congressional backlash that 
undermined the credibility of the original threat to use force and any threats he 
might want to make in the future: “By giving Congress a vote, the President 
appears not only to have tied his own hands in carrying out his threat, but to have 
tipped off American rivals and partners that congressional support for new military 
actions (for which the President might also seek congressional authorization) is 
generally frail.”60 President Obama’s advisors understood that Congress’s response 
was a “potential turning point that could effectively define his foreign policy for 
his final three years in office.”61 
From the standpoint of both unilateral-action theory and Neustadt’s 
framework of presidential power, it looks less like an act of seasoned 
statesmanship than a case where a President who was unsure what to do got very 
lucky. Machiavelli noted the importance of fortuna to leaders, but he also 
cautioned that it is a dangerous thing to rely on.62  
 
 
 
56 John B. Judis, Lessons From Obama’s Almost-War, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 2013, 
at 33. 
57 Mazzetti et al., supra note 51. 
58 Scott Wilson, Obama Demands Congress Clarify U.S. Military Intervention in 
Syria and Beyond, WASH. POST, Sep. 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/oba 
ma-demands-clarifiy-us-military-intervention-in-syria-and-beyond/2013/09/06/3897e436-1 
70a-11e3-be6e-dc6ae8a5b3a8_story.html. 
59 Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike 
in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleea 
st/syria.html?_r=0; Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, Inside Obama’s Syria Deliberations: “The 
Promise of More Discussion”, DEFENSE ONE (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.defenseone.com 
/management/2013/09/inside-obamas-syria-deliberations-promise-more-discussion/70510/ 
(stating that at least some key White House aides learned about it only when the President 
announced it publicly). 
60 Matthew C. Waxman, Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War Powers, 123 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 297, 308 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/ forum/syria-threats-of- 
force-and-constitutional-war-powers.  
61 Peter Baker, White House Looks to Syria Vote as Rudder for Rest of Term, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/world/europe/obama-arrives-in- 
russia-for-g20-summit.html?pagewanted=all. 
62 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 84–87 (Peter Bondanella trans., Oxford 
2005). 
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II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR UNILATERAL ACTION THEORIES 
 
After a decade of tremendous growth in the literature on unilateral action, 
scholars have established the basic elements of how presidents have wielded their 
authority to accomplish governing and policy goals. This work has demonstrated 
that presidents rely on their unilateral authority to make and reshape policy, change 
institutional structures and procedures, and outmaneuver Congress in the 
competition over influence and control. The structures and unique incentives of the 
executive institution shaped presidential behavior, not the individual character of 
presidents as embodied in presidential style, character, skill, or temperament. As 
Moe put it, the best way to understand the presidency “is to stop thinking about 
presidents as people and start thinking about them generically: as faceless, 
nameless, institutional actors whose behavior is an institutional pattern.”63 In 
unilateral-action models, it does not matter who occupies the Oval Office because 
presidential behavior is driven by predictable and understandable incentives that 
produce regularized behavior. 
One of the first things new presidents confront is the knowledge that they can 
be held responsible for everything that happens in government. This is particularly 
important on national security and (since 9/11) counterterrorism issues. President 
Obama’s attitudes toward surveillance were different from those of candidate 
Obama: “Like other presidents before him, the idealistic candidate . . . found that 
the tricky trade-offs of national security issues look different to the person charged 
with using that power to ensure public safety.”64 
This behavior has deep historical roots. Shortly after the 1800 election, 
Alexander Hamilton predicted that President Thomas Jefferson would be more 
supportive of a strong executive than his campaign rhetoric suggested. As 
described by Rob Chernow, “whenever it suited his views, Jefferson had supported 
executive power, as if he knew he would someday inherit the presidency and did 
not wish to weaken the office.”65 William Howard Taft took a more expansive 
view of executive power as President than he did in his later publication, Our Chief 
Magistrate and His Powers.66 In noting the various authorities on different sides of 
debates over presidential power, Justice Jackson observed that “it even seems that 
President Taft cancels out Professor Taft.”67 
63 Moe, supra note 1, at 379. 
64 Peter Baker, Obama’s Path from Critic to Overseer of Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/us/obamas-path-from-critic-to-defender-of-spyi 
ng.html. 
65 RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 634 (2004). 
66 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139–40 
(1916). 
67 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). The pattern extends as well to those who advise presidents. As a law 
professor, Harold Koh criticized “the false promise of a foreign policymaking system 
overdominated by the executive,” Harold Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in 
Foreign Affairs: Lesson of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1319 (1988), and 
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This perspective explains why President Obama took a broad view of 
executive power once in office, but it offers less insight into what was different 
about the Syria case. Here, the appropriate question is asking why, generally, 
presidents might choose to be cautious in their exercise of unilateral powers.  
Within the literature, there are several outstanding puzzles that are not yet 
resolved. Among the most important is the inverse of the question of why 
presidents rely on unilateral action: we know something about the circumstances in 
which presidents are likely to rely on it, but somewhat less about the circumstances 
in which presidents will decline to push the envelope. This is a difficult 
phenomenon to study, because it is by definition difficult to observe things that do 
not happen. We know when a President acts unilaterally because there is a clear 
indicator of that action—an executive order, proclamation, directive, or some other 
instrument.68 A decision to not act is harder to interpret, because there will often be 
nothing to see. Sometimes this process can be observed, particularly in those cases 
where there is an ongoing and public discussion of the President’s role in 
addressing an issue that is clearly within his discretionary authority.69 But Syria 
constitutes a specific instance in which a President publicly considered and then 
just as publicly rejected an option to act unilaterally, therefore presenting an 
opportunity to investigate it. 
One demonstration of the problem is the effect of divided government on the 
frequency of unilateral action. The logic of unilateral action predicts that presidents 
will fall back on their unilateral power when other paths, especially legislative 
ones, are blocked. Consequently, the expectation is that unilateral actions will 
increase under divided government, when the President will have difficulty 
assembling legislative majorities. Presidents and their staffs, as well as reporters, 
urged a broader role for Congress and the judiciary, especially for war powers. As State 
Department legal advisor during the first Obama administration, however, he took a 
decidedly more expansive view of presidential authority, arguing that no congressional 
declaration of war was necessary for the Libya operations because the President “could 
reasonably determine that U.S. operations in Libya would serve important national 
interests.” Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
112th Cong. 17 (2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State).  
68 An obvious exception to this would be a classified action, such as President George 
W. Bush’s secret 2001 order authorizing the National Security Agency to conduct 
warrantless electronic surveillance. But some of these actions, such as the NSA 
surveillance program, are eventually revealed through disclosure or leaks. See James Risen 
& Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2005, http://www/nytimes.com/2005/12/16program.htm.  
69 An example is the 1993 controversy over President Clinton’s campaign promise to 
issue an executive order ending the ban on gay military personnel. Faced with 
overwhelming opposition within Congress and among military leaders, the President had 
no choice but to back down. Instead, President Clinton proposed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
as a compromise, which Congress subsequently enacted in the 1994 Department of 
Defense Authorization Act. Jeffrey T. Spoeri, The Pennsylvania Avenue Tug-of-War: The 
President Versus Congress Over the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military, 45 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 175, 175–76 (1994).  
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behave as if they believe this to be true. After the Republican sweep in the 1994 
midterm elections, in which the Republicans captured majorities for the first time 
in forty years, White House officials forecasted more “regulations, executive 
orders, and other presidential tools to work around Capitol Hill, much as Ronald 
Reagan and George Bush did when the House and the Senate were in Democratic 
hands.”70 During the Clinton impeachment, advisor Paul Begala foresaw increased 
reliance on executive orders and other unilateral tools. In an oft-repeated (and 
reviled) quote, he summed up the thinking: “Stroke of the pen . . . . Law of the 
land. Kind of cool.”71 President Obama said much the same thing in 2011, telling 
aides that “the administration needed to more aggressively use executive power to 
govern in the face of Congressional obstructionism.”72 In 2014, aides promised a 
renewed focus on “an executive style of governing that aims to sidestep Congress 
more often.”73  
The actual empirical practice, however, is much murkier. While we can easily 
enough point to specific examples that fit the presumptive pattern, the full range of 
data suggests a far more nuanced picture. Presidents rely less on unilateral action 
when they face divided government, no matter what their staffs say they will do, in 
part because of fear of a congressional backlash. Investigations, hearings, and the 
prospect, however small, of Congress overturning a unilateral act can raise the 
political cost of presidential adventurism. 
William Howell and Jon Pevehouse have found strong evidence that 
presidents are less likely to use military force when they face divided government, 
concluding that Congress retains a substantial role in limiting presidential 
discretion.74 Their findings are based on a database of possible opportunities for 
presidents to take this step.75 They have analyzed patterns of how presidents use 
force (or do not) to identify the causal factors that shape those decisions.76 They 
found that presidents are more likely to be cautious in ordering the use of force 
when they face substantial and organized congressional opposition, as measured by 
the number of seats controlled by the opposition party and measures of unity.77 
70 Douglas Jehl, The 1994 Elections: States the President; One Hand Tied, Clinton 
Offers the Other, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/10/us/the- 
1994-elections-states-the-president-one-hand-tied-clinton-offers-the-other.html. 
71 James Bennett, True to Form, Clinton Shifts Energies Back to U.S. Focus, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 5, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/05/us/true-to-form-clinton-shifts-en 
ergies-back-to-us-focus.html. 
72 Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2012, http://wwwnytimes.com/2014/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-l 
et-obama-bypass-congress.html. 
73 Scott Wilson, Obama’s Rough 2013 Prompts a New Blueprint, WASH. POST, Jan. 
25, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-rough-2013-promts-a-new-blue 
print/2014/01/25/99cddd0c-846d-11e3-8099-9181471f7aaf_story.html. 
74 WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: 
CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 92–99 (2007). 
75 Id. at 78–81. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 92–99. 
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Presidents have frequently declined opportunities to use force, they found, with 
outcomes shaped by the possibility of politically costly opposition.78 
Anticipating the reaction to a potential unilateral move is thus consistent with 
underlying theory, as is deciding not to pursue a unilateral strategy when the 
political costs are too high. This anticipation is, in Howell’s view, central to any 
useful model of unilateral action: 
 
[W]henever presidents contemplate a unilateral action, they anticipate 
how Congress and the judiciary will respond. The limits to unilateral 
powers are critically defined by the capacity, and willingness, of 
Congress and the judiciary to overturn the president. Rarely will 
presidents issue a unilateral directive when they know that other 
branches of government will subsequently reverse it.79 
 
This serves as a useful general explanation. However, applying it to any specific 
case requires caution, as the argument very easily becomes tautological: any 
presidential choice to not to push the boundaries of executive power can then, by 
definition, be attributed to a fear of a backlash or unacceptable political costs. 
It is reasonable to think that Obama’s decision to defer to Congress was a 
function of what the congressional response might have been on other issues if he 
opted to go alone—the budget, Iran, appointments, relations with allies—or what 
the political consequences would be of a poor outcome. Even so, the sequence of 
the President’s decision-making remains difficult to explain as something other 
than a series of miscalculations. If the political costs were unacceptably high, it 
was still a mistake to declare that he wanted to attack and then cede that discretion 
to Congress. In doing so, President Obama, quite literally, invited Congress to 
repudiate him. A President who acknowledges in his own acts the utility of 
unilateral power in the face of congressional resistance ought not to have put 
himself in such a position, particularly when by his own admission it was 
unnecessary. 
The problem is not as simple as President Obama asking Congress for 
something that it would not provide. Presidents do this routinely, never expect to 
get everything they ask for, and rarely suffer for it. Rather, it was surrendering the 
initiative by giving up the authority to make the decision. For presidents, there are 
few things worse than vacillating or appearing indecisive, and failing to act can be 
worse than making a bad decision: 
 
Nothing invites censure like failing to utilize the full extent of authority 
to meet a crisis head-on. The greatest disgrace a president can commit is 
to sit idle while the world unravels around him. Presidents who advance 
normatively bad policy, who patently pursue their own private interests, 
or who engage in corrupt or even criminal behavior will usually receive 
78 Id. 
79 HOWELL, supra note 2, at 27. 
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their due admonishments. But when refusing to act—or worse yet, 
proving unable to act precisely when action appears called for—
presidents invite all sorts of ridicule on themselves.80  
 
III.  EFFECT AS PRECEDENT 
 
Because the constitutional boundaries of executive power are ambiguous, they 
are strongly shaped by practice through “common law constitutionalism.”81 In 
areas lacking a precise delineation of constitutional authorities, competition 
between the President and Congress over political control plays a role as well. 
Long-standing congressional deference to presidential action “may be treated as a 
gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”82 In blunter 
terms, a presidential unilateral move that is not unambiguously turned back by 
either Congress or the judiciary becomes a justification that future presidents can 
use to do the same thing or, more likely, push a bit further.83 
Will the deferral to Congress have any long-term effect on the allocation of 
war powers? One way to answer the question is by examining previous instances 
of presidents making similar decisions. There are two analogous cases: President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who sought (and received) congressional authorizations to 
deploy military forces in the straits of Taiwan in 1955 and the Middle East in 
1957; and President Clinton, who asked Congress to support an air campaign in 
Kosovo in 1999 (which Congress declined to do).  
These cases are similar to President Obama’s in that neither President 
conceded that he needed prior congressional approval for military action. President 
Eisenhower asked for congressional authorization because he believed that 
“national commitments would be stronger if entered into jointly by both 
branches,”84 not because he felt that he lacked the requisite constitutional authority 
to deploy troops without it.85 Congressional action was politically useful, in other 
80 WILLIAM G. HOWELL, THINKING ABOUT THE PRESIDENCY: THE PRIMACY OF 
POWER 106 (2013). 
81 Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century 
World, 48 ARK. L. REV. 1, 15 (1995). 
82 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
83 Even a seemingly trivial power can follow this pattern. Robert Spitzer notes that 
President Obama continued and extended the arcane practice of the “protective return 
veto,” in which the President both pocket vetoes a bill during an intrasession recess and 
returns the bill to Congress as a regular veto. While such vetoes do not have any clear 
substantive consequences, they also have no constitutional validity; the very fact that the 
practice has become common reveals how something “unconstitutional on its face” 
becomes legitimated through “sheer repetition.” Robert J. Spitzer, Growing Executive 
Power: The Strange Case of the “Protective Return” Pocket Veto, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 637, 650, 652 (2012).  
84 FISHER, supra note 5, at 116. 
85 President Eisenhower tended to duck the question of whether the President had the 
authority to order the use of force without Congress, arguing instead that “cooperation of 
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words, but not required. President Eisenhower’s 1955 request to Congress was 
explicit on this point: in asking for authorization to deploy troops to Formosa 
Straits, he claimed that “authority for some of the actions which might be required 
would be inherent in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief,” but a 
congressional resolution “would make clear the unified and serious intention of our 
Government, our Congress, and our people.”86 In this regard, his position was the 
same as President Obama’s.87 
President Clinton’s 1999 request was likewise a matter of political utility. In a 
March 23, 1999, letter to Senate leadership, he said, “[W]ithout regard to our 
differing views on the Constitution about the use of force, I ask for your legislative 
support as we address the crisis in Kosovo.”88 The Senate voted 58–41 to approve 
military action.89 President Clinton ordered the strikes to begin the next day, before 
the House had acted.90 A month later, the resolution failed to pass the House, 
losing on a 213–213 tie.91 
President Eisenhower has been praised for taking a narrow view of the 
presidential war power. Louis Fisher observed that President Eisenhower “avoided 
unilateral moves in dispatching troops abroad” in reaction to President Harry S. 
Truman’s actions in Korea and in the Steel Seizure case.92 Richard Grimmett 
the Congress” enhances the credibility of U.S. commitments. Id. at 120. Fisher notes that 
when President Eisenhower was asked a direct question on the matter by House Majority 
Leader John McCormack (D-Mass.) in 1957, the President responded that “greater effect 
could be had from a consensus of Executive and Legislative opinion . . . . [T]he 
Constitution assumes that our two branches of government should get along together.” Id. 
at 121 (quoting DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE 179 (1965)).  
86 Letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Minority Leaders of the Senate 
and House of Representatives Concerning Measures to Aid Economic Growth, 1958 PUB. 
PAPERS 208, 209–10 (March 8, 1958).  
87 Even before President Obama’s Syria decision, observers had drawn parallels 
between him and President Eisenhower, particularly with respect to the claim that both 
presidents were similarly cautious in their foreign policy (what Zakaria calls “strategic 
restraint”) and reluctance to intervene militarily in foreign disputes. Fareed Zakaria, On 
Foreign Policy, Why Barack is Like Ike, TIME (Dec. 19, 2012), http://poy.time.com/2012/1 
2/19/on-foreign-policy-why-barack-is-like-ike/. 
88 145 CONG. REC. S3101 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1999) (statement of Sen. John Warner). 
89 S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. H2451 (1999).  
90 A Kosovo Chronology, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html (last visited May 1, 2014). 
91 S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. H2451 (1999). In a very narrow 
sense, this would constitute a prior case of Congress refusing to approve a presidential 
request for authorization. In this instance, though, the Senate had approved the resolution, 
and on the day the campaign started, the House overwhelmingly, by a vote of 424 to 1, 
approved a resolution “expressing support” for military personnel engaged in the operation. 
H.R. Res. 130, 106th Cong. (1999). The House tie vote took place only after the campaign 
had started, and in May of that year, Congress approved emergency supplemental 
appropriations legislation that provided funding for the effort. Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, §§ 2001–12, 113 Stat. 57 (1999). 
92 FISHER, supra note 5, at 116. 
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offers a slight qualification, arguing that apart from actions to evacuate or protect 
U.S. civilians and military personnel in conflict areas, President Eisenhower did 
not unilaterally order the use of force.93 
But President Eisenhower may not have been quite as restrained as these 
sources claim. According to a widely used database of military actions, President 
Eisenhower used military force as a political threat fifty-eight times, including 
major cases in Asia, Central America, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa.94 Not 
all of these cases involved large-scale deployments, but all were either active or 
covert, or threatened military operations.95 Other instances of President 
Eisenhower’s use of force were at least arguably unilateral. The deployment of 
fourteen thousand Marines to Lebanon in July 1958 was nominally permitted by 
the 1957 congressional authorization,96 but President Eisenhower made no mention 
of the authorization in announcing the step, saying only that he made the decision 
“after taking advice from leaders of both the Executive and Congressional 
branches of the government.”97 Some scholars concluded that President 
Eisenhower was relying on his “inherent” constitutional power98 or “the ever more 
capacious presidential prerogative.”99 
In fact, President Eisenhower held a broad view of the executive’s inherent 
powers. He was especially aggressive in the use of covert operations without 
congressional authorization, including U.S. involvement in the overthrowing of 
governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954.100 The CIA’s own internal 
history of its intervention in Guatemala conceded the “blatant illegality” of a 
blockade imposed as part of the operation and the boarding of French and British 
ships “in defiance of international law.”101 It was clear that President Eisenhower 
understood a blockade to be an unambiguous act of war; in responding to 
suggestions that he impose a blockade of China in response to that country’s 
espionage trials and convictions against American pilots shot down during the 
Korean War, he stated, 
93 See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32170, INSTANCES OF USE 
OF UNITED STATES ARMS FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2009, at 11–12 (2010). 
94 JAMES M. MCCORMICK, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND PROCESS 73 (5th ed. 
2010). For detailed calculations of the use of American military force between 1946 and 
1975, see BARRY M. BLECHMEN & STEPHEN S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. 
ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 547–53 (1978). 
95 Id. 
96 FISHER, supra note 5, at 120–24. 
97 Statement by the President Following the Landing of United States Marines at 
Beirut, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 553 (July 15, 1958).  
98 Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 26 (1970). 
99 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 162 (1973). 
100 FISHER, supra note 5, at 273. President Eisenhower, moreover, was actively hostile 
to the idea of congressional involvement of intelligence operations and relied on unilateral 
action to deflect and minimize the threat of congressional oversight. MAYER, supra note 2, 
170–71. 
101 NICK CULLATHER, SECRET HISTORY: THE CIA’S CLASSIFIED ACCOUNT OF ITS 
OPERATIONS IN GUATEMALA, 1952–1954, at 82 (1999). 
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A blockade is an act in war intended to bring your adversary to your 
way of thinking or to his knees. . . . [T]he word “blockade,” is, so far as I 
know, an act of war, a part of war. I have not checked this with the 
constitutional lawyers, but I believe it to be true.102 
 
At a minimum, President Eisenhower’s desire to secure Congress’s support for 
large military operations was inconsistent with his general constitutional view of 
the President’s “war powers” and, as shown above, did not stop him from using 
military force when he deemed it necessary. 
Moreover, not every observer praised the resolutions as examples of careful 
deliberation or restraint. Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsburg argue that 
“Eisenhower in effect demanded a blank check from Congress for possible military 
action in the Taiwan Straits and the Middle East.”103 Julian Zelizer, a historian, 
saw the Formosa Resolution as “the second step in the expansion of presidential 
war-making authority that began when President Truman sent troops to Korea 
without a formal declaration of war,” because President Eisenhower would not 
need additional congressional action before initiating even full-scale conflict.104 
Stephen Griffin concludes that the resolutions represented “nothing unusual in the 
terms of . . . legal authority” but still criticizes them as merely “ways for presidents 
to get Congress on board rather than truly deliberate and build a cycle of 
accountability.”105 
More germane to the present case is that President Eisenhower’s request for 
advance authorization did not interrupt the pattern of increasing presidential 
discretion in using military force. Mariah Zeisberg finds in these requests a broader 
pattern that was not constricting:  
 
By the end of the Eisenhower administration, a kind of 
accommodation had been reached. Presidents would seek legislative 
support, but with the idea that the legislature was supporting a 
constitutional power that was already the president’s. This would allow 
for ongoing legislative participation in constructing a structured 
defensive politics—naming enemies, priorities, and focusing attention—
while reinforcing the constitutional construction of the independent 
presidential defensive war powers that had been achieved in the past ten 
years.106 
 
102 The President’s News Conference of December 2, 1954, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 1073, 
1076. 
103 MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBURG, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: UNCHECKED 
& UNBALANCED 262–63 (2007). 
104 JULIAN E. ZELIZER, ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY—FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 130 (2010). 
105 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 106 (2013). 
106 MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
142 (2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
President Obama’s decision to defer to Congress will not serve as a precedent 
that constrains future presidents, since it did not resolve any questions about the 
correct distribution of the constitutional war powers and was a pragmatic judgment 
rather than a principled one. Previous instances of presidents making analogous 
decisions had no lasting effect on the overall trend toward increasing presidential 
discretion in using military force. 
Presidential unilateralism begets other instances of unilateral action. 
Furthermore, engaging Congress in what is more commonly an area of unilateral 
action not only fails to serve as a precedent in the other direction but can also lead 
to more unilateralism. The process of presidential action could certainly be 
described as a ratchet process. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect a single 
decision to reverse a long-standing historical trend. Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule have little patience with ratchet arguments in any event, insisting that 
the necessary conditions do not exist and that the term serves as a loose label 
“often confused with a simple trend or with endogenous but reversible change in 
some variable that would quickly revert to its original value if other legal or social 
conditions changed.”107  
If President Obama’s decision will have little long-term effect on the 
distribution of power, what lessons can be drawn from it? We might reframe the 
underlying prediction of maximizing discretion as a normative one for which 
presidents need to be aware that foregoing unilateral action comes with political 
cost. In 2014, President Obama and his aides concluded that he has not been 
aggressive enough in asserting the office’s capacity to act as a general matter. 
Reviewing 2013—which the White House concedes was not a very good year for 
the President—Senior Advisor Dan Pfeiffer concluded that the President “too often 
governed more like a prime minister than a President” and recommended an 
emphasis on “an executive style of governing that aims to sidestep Congress more 
often.”108 It was more of a rhetorical shift than a substantive one, since President 
Obama had hardly shied away from unilateral action earlier in his presidency, with 
a few exceptions. But it is more consistent with unilateral theory, and it suggests 
that the President recognizes the risks of passivity and the importance of retaining 
the initiative. 
107 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 24, at 133. 
108 Wilson, supra note 58. 
 
                                                     
